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We surveyed 100 Italian defense attorneys about their knowledge and beliefs about factors
affecting eyewitness accuracy.The results of similar surveys show that U.S. defense attor-
neys were significantly more knowledgeable than other legal professionals, including U.S.
prosecutors and U.S. and European judges.The present survey of Italian defense attorneys
produced similar results. However, the results suggest that the defense attorney’s superior
performance may be due at least in part to their skepticism of eyewitness testimony rather
than their greater knowledge of eyewitness factors.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a growing concern among eyewitness researchers that
legal professionals lack sufficient knowledge about memory and
the many factors that may affect eyewitness accuracy to prevent
wrongful convictions from eyewitness error (Benton et al., 2007;
Wise et al., 2007). The list of historical and contemporary examples
of persons wrongfully convicted by eyewitness testimony is long
indeed. For example, in 1796 Joseph Lesurques, a retired army offi-
cer, was wrongfully executed for the robbery and brutal murders
of mail coach attendants. Two eyewitnesses who erroneously iden-
tified him as one of the bandits while he was in the waiting room
of the magistrate who was hearing the case caused his wrongful
conviction (Sporer et al., 1996). Another famous example of eye-
witness error occurred 100 years later, in 1896, when a London
court convicted Adolf Beck, a Norwegian citizen, for swindling
women out of their jewelry after 12 of the victims erroneously
identified him in a lineup. The Beck case led to major reforms
including the creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal. Many
judges in Commonwealth countries still cite the case as a glaring
example of the dangers of eyewitness testimony (Coates, 2001).
Such cases may be well known historical examples of eyewit-
ness error, but eyewitness errors happen with alarming frequency
in current criminal cases. For example, eyewitness error occurred
in more than 75% of the 302 DNA exoneration cases in the U.S.
(Saks and Koehler, 2005)1. Moreover, studies of wrongful felony
1www.innocenceproject.com
convictions in the U.S. prior to the DNA exoneration cases show
that eyewitness error is involved in half or more of all wrongful
felony convictions (Borchard, 1932; Huff, 1987; Rattner, 1988).
Concern about the ability of criminal justice systems to mitigate
eyewitness errors has been exacerbated by recent surveys in China,
Estonia, Norway, Sweden, and U.S. of judges, law enforcement
officers, and attorneys (Wise and Safer, 2004; Granhag et al., 2005;
Benton et al., 2006; Magnussen et al., 2008; Wise et al., 2009, 2010,
2011; Kask, 2011). These surveys show that in general legal pro-
fessionals’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony does not exceed the
knowledge of students, jury members, or prospective jury mem-
bers (Benton et al., 2006; Magnussen et al., 2010; Wise and Safer,
2010; see also Desmarais and Read, 2011). It also differs signif-
icantly from the knowledge of eyewitness experts (Kassin et al.,
2001).
Moreover, sizable minorities or even majorities of the legal
professionals disagree with eyewitness experts even when there
is a strong consensus among experts about how an eyewitness
factor affects accuracy, and there is strong empirical support for
their consensus. It is the frequency of legal professionals’ wrong
answers rather than their “do not know” responses that is espe-
cially alarming. These results suggest that many legal professionals
rely on common sense and intuition when evaluating eyewitness
accuracy rather than scientific research.
The single exception to the general pattern of results for
legal professionals’ knowledge about eyewitness testimony is U.S.
defense attorneys. They performed significantly better than U.S.
prosecutors and the other legal professions (Wise et al., 2009)
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and closer to the eyewitness experts (Kassin et al., 2001). Does
the superior performance of the U.S. defense attorneys reflect
greater knowledge of eyewitness factors, or does it simply indi-
cate a more skeptical attitude about the accuracy of eyewitness
testimony? After all, it is defense attorneys’ responsibility to chal-
lenge the validity of the state’s evidence, and therefore they are
likely to be more skeptical than other legal professionals of the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Wise et al. (2009) tested the
latter hypothesis by distributing the questionnaire to a sam-
ple of undergraduate students who were instructed to take a
skeptical attitude toward eyewitnesses. They found some sup-
port for the hypothesis that defense attorneys’ superior perfor-
mance was partially a product of skepticism, rather than greater
knowledge.
Still, the superior performance of the U.S. defense attorneys
might be a chance finding, or it may only apply to U.S. defense
attorneys. For instance, the DNA exonerations cases in the U.S.
may have sensitized U.S. defense attorneys to the problem of eye-
witness error. We conducted a study of Italian defense attorneys,
using a slightly modified version of the Wise and Safer ques-
tionnaire (Wise and Safer, 2004; Magnussen et al., 2008, 2010)
translated into Italian. Italian defense lawyers tend to specialize
in criminal law and accept mainly criminal cases. If the superior
knowledge of defense attorneys is associated with their profes-
sional role, we would expect the beliefs and knowledge of the
Italian defense attorneys to be similar to the U.S. defense attor-
neys and the eyewitness experts rather than the other U.S. and
European legal professionals.
THE ITALIAN AND U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
The Italian criminal justice system is a mixture of the inquisitor-
ial and adversarial systems of justice. For example, though Italian
prosecutors are responsible for collecting evidence, judges can also
take an active role in gathering evidence and can use their own
expert to provide advice on scientific or technical evidence. In
Italy, the criminal process is divided into two phases: the inves-
tigative phase and the trial phase. The preliminary investigation
begins either when a crime is reported to the public prosecutor,
or the prosecutor or law enforcement agency discovers sufficient
evidence of a crime. The preliminary investigative phase has a
maximum time limit, usually 6 months, which begins to run when
the name of the suspect is officially recorded. The judge for pre-
liminary investigations supervises the pre-trial phase of a criminal
trial in Italy and determines if there is sufficient evidence to take
to a case to trial.
The Italian judiciary is independent and once appointed judges
serve for life. Italy has a three tier court system that consists of trial
courts, intermediate appellate courts, and a supreme court. In Italy,
citizens, called lay judges, are involved in the determination of a
defendant’s guilt in only the most serious criminal cases, where the
maximum sentence is more than 24 years. In these cases, 2 profes-
sional judges and 11 citizens randomly selected render the verdict
in the case. Their verdict does not have to be unanimous. In all
other criminal cases, either one judge or three professional judges
decide the case depending on the seriousness of the crime. Lay
judges also help decide appeals in the Court of Assizes of Appeals
but not in Italy’s other intermediate appellate courts. The highest
Italian court is the Court of Cassation, and it can only review lower
court decisions on the law not the facts.
The U.S. has an adversarial system of justice. The parties to a
criminal action are primarily responsible for gathering and pre-
senting the evidence in a criminal case. Although judges can call
witnesses and ask questions of witnesses, they rarely do so espe-
cially in jury trials because they want to appear impartial. Most
reports of crimes are filed with U.S. law enforcement agencies,
which are responsible for investigating crimes. As long as a statute
of limitations has not run, no time limitation exists in the U.S. for
criminal investigations. In the U.S., prosecutors decide whether
to indict a suspect and for what crimes. The judiciary does not
interfere with prosecutors’ discretion to determine the criminal
charges against a defendant unless there is a violation of a defen-
dant’s constitutional rights. In the U.S., judges do not supervise
criminal investigations. Like in Italy, U.S. defendants have the right
to remain silent.
The U.S. judiciary is also independent. The U.S. has two types of
judges: state or federal. Most state judges are elected while federal
judges are appointed for life. As in Italy, most states and the federal
courts use a three tier system of courts: trial courts, intermediate
appellate courts, and a supreme court. In the U.S. defendants for
serious offenses (i.e., usually crimes that are punishable by more
than 6 months in prison), have the right to a jury trial, and the
jury’s verdict must be unanimous. U.S. appellate courts generally
including the highest court in a jurisdiction can review cases on
both factual and legal grounds. The U.S. Supreme Court and the
highest state court generally, however, only hear cases when there
is an important legal issue in dispute. In the U.S., jurors play no
role in appeals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The questionnaire was distributed by E-mail (with link to the web
questionnaire) to members of the organization Laboratorio Esame
e Controesame (LAPEC). Respondents (n= 100), six of whom also
had acted as prosecutors, were geographically distributed all over
Italy. There were 60 males and 40 females; their mean age was 43.7,
and they had been attorneys for an average of 14.4 years.
QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire was an Italian translation of the Wise and Safer
questionnaire (Wise and Safer, 2004; Magnussen et al., 2008). To
increase the response rate, the questionnaire covered fewer eyewit-
ness factors than some other surveys (e.g., Desmarais and Read,
2011; Kask, 2011). Eyewitness factors were selected for the ques-
tionnaire when there was strong agreement among experts (Kassin
et al., 2001) and good empirical support for how the factor affects
accuracy. In addition the questionnaire covered some eyewitness
factors not included in other surveys, as detailed below.
The participants were asked (a) to respond to 12 eyewitness
statements and (b) provide the personal background information
summarized in the preceding paragraph. The statements probed
respondents’ beliefs and knowledge about eyewitness factors that
affect accuracy and are presented in Table 1. The respondents
indicated whether they agreed or disagreed with a statement (1–6,
12) or whether they believed the statement was generally true or
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Table 1 | Eyewitness topics and statements and the percentage correct (rounded) for various legal groups.
Topic Statement Percent correct
Italian
defense
attorneys (%)
U.S.
defense
attorneys (%)
U.S.
prosecutors
(%)
U.S.
judges
(%)
Norwegian
judges
(%)
Effects of a hat
(A)
It is significantly harder for a witness of a crime
to recognize a perpetrator who is wearing a hat
during the commission of a crime than a
perpetrator who is not wearing a hat
66 56 41 44 55
Minor details (D) A witness’s ability to recall minor details about a
crime is a good indicator of the accuracy of the
witness’s identification of the perpetrator of the
crime
20 53 7 23 31
Attitudes and
expectations (A)
An eyewitness’s perception and memory for an
event may be affected by his or her attitudes
and expectations
98 99 88 94 98
Conducting
lineups (A)
A police officer who knows which member of
the lineup or photo array is the suspect should
not conduct the lineup or photo array
94 95 42 62 84
Effects of
post-event
information (A)
Eyewitness testimony about an event often
reflects not only what a witness actually saw
but information obtained later on from other
witnesses, the police, the media, etc.
91 96 66 84 94
Confidence-
accuracy
(D)
At trial, an eyewitness’s confidence is a good
predictor of his or her accuracy in identifying the
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime
34 82 22 33 31
Confidence
malleability (T)
An eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced
by factors that are unrelated to identification
accuracy
85 98 82 89 85
Weapon focus (T) The presence of a weapon can impair an
eyewitness’s ability to accurately identify the
perpetrator’s face
73 88 50 69 68
Mug-shot-
induced bias
(T)
Exposure to mug shots of a suspect increases
the likelihood that the witness will later choose
that suspect from a lineup
93 95 71 74 84
Lineup
presentation
format (T)
Witnesses are more likely to misidentify
someone in a culprit-absent lineup when it is
presented in a simultaneous (i.e., all members
of a lineup are present at the same time) as
opposed to a sequential procedure (i.e., all
members of a lineup are presented individually)
48 59 22 19 38
Forgetting curve
(T)
The rate of memory loss for an event is greatest
right after the event and then levels off over time
87 34 21 31 51
Jurors distinguish
eyewitnesses (D)
Jurors can distinguish between accurate and
inaccurate eyewitnesses
56 89 38 39 40
(A) Indicates agreement with the statement is scored as correct.
(D) Indicates disagreement with the statement is scored as correct.
(T) Indicates a response of “generally true” is scored as correct.
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generally false (statements 7–11). They could also have responded
to the statements that they “don’t know” or were “uncertain” of
the answer. We determined the correct answer to the statements
based on the responses of eyewitness experts (Kassin et al., 2001),
and our prior reviews of the eyewitness literature (Wise and Safer,
2004; Magnussen et al., 2008; Wise et al., 2009).
Respondents also answered questions about whether attorneys,
judges, and jurors were knowledgeable about the eyewitness fac-
tors, whether defendants should be convicted solely on the basis
of eyewitness testimony only in exceptional circumstances, and
how frequently eyewitness error is involved in wrongful convic-
tions. Finally they were asked about their exposure to educational
materials about eyewitness testimony.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results of the eyewitness questionnaire are shown in Table 1. For
some eyewitness statements (3, 5, 7, 9), a large percentage of the
Italian attorneys gave the correct answer, which was also true of the
U.S. attorneys (Wise et al., 2009), U.S. and Norwegian judges (Wise
and Safer, 2004; Magnussen et al., 2008), and Norwegian lay per-
sons with jury experience (Magnussen et al., 2010). For most state-
ments, however, the percentage of correct answers for the Italian
sample is quite modest, as was true of other surveys of legal pro-
fessionals. In general, however, the responses of the Italian defense
attorneys are more similar to the responses of the U.S. defense
attorneys than to the responses of the US prosecutors and US and
Norwegian judges. The Italian defense attorneys’ responses in gen-
eral, however, were somewhat less accurate than the responses of
the U.S. defense attorneys. The overall score of the Italian defense
attorneys was 71% correct, which is somewhat lower than the score
of the U.S. defense attorneys (79%), but higher than the scores
of U.S. prosecutors (46%) U.S. judges (57%), Norwegian judges
(66%), and Norwegian lay persons with jury experience (53%)
to the same questions in previous surveys (Wise and Safer, 2004;
Magnussen et al., 2008, 2010; Wise et al., 2009). Interestingly, the
U.S. prosecutors were the least knowledgeable legal professionals
in the surveys, even scoring below the Norwegian jurors.
For statement 11, the Italian defense attorneys gave more cor-
rect answers than the other legal professionals in any of the other
surveys. This result may have occurred because statement 11 may
have been less clear in English than in Italian (Desmarais and Read,
2011).
We also asked the Italian defense attorneys how knowledge-
able other legal professions are about eyewitness testimony. A
total of 73% of the Italian defense attorneys agreed that attor-
neys are knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony, but only 51%
of them agreed that judges are knowledge. In short, the Italian
defense attorneys believed that attorneys know more about eye-
witness testimony than judges. Surveys of legal professionals about
eyewitness testimony have consistently found that groups believe
their members know more about eyewitness evidence than other
types of legal professionals (Wise and Safer, 2010).
PERCEPTIONS OF EYEWITNESS RELIABILITY AND ITS ROLE IN
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
To assess the attorneys’ views of the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony, we asked them whether they agreed or disagreed with the
following statement: “only in exceptional circumstances should a
defendant be convicted of a crime solely on the basis of eyewit-
ness testimony.” Of the Italian defense attorneys, 59% agreed with
this statement. In the US samples, 70% of the defense attorneys
agreed with it, whereas 61% of the prosecutors disagreed with this
statement. A total of 23% of the U.S. judges and 36% of the Norwe-
gian judges agreed with this statement, and 42% of the Norwegian
juror sample also agreed with it. Thus the responses of the Italian
defense attorneys were more similar to the US defense attorneys
than to the other legal professionals, who were much less skepti-
cal regarding jurors’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony and the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
The attorneys were also asked to indicate out of 100 cases of
wrongful felony convictions, how many they thought on average
would be due at least in part to eyewitness error. A conserva-
tive estimate is that eyewitness error occurs in at least half of
all wrongful felony convictions in the U.S. (Scheck et al., 2000).
The mean estimate for the Italian defense attorneys was 35 cases,
which is similar to the US prosecutors. The mean estimate of the
US defense attorneys was 60 cases (Wise et al., 2009). Thus, for this
question the estimate of the Italian sample was more similar to the
US prosecutors’ estimate than to the defense attorneys’ estimate.
EXPOSURE TO EDUCATIONAL MATERIAL
What has been the extent of the exposure of legal professional
to educational materials about eyewitness testimony? Of the Ital-
ian defense attorneys, 30% reported reading an article or book
or attending a seminar on eyewitness testimony, 27% reported
exposure to two of these sources, and 21% had exposure to all
three sources, whereas 17% reported no exposure to educational
material. In the US samples, a significantly lower percentage of
prosecutors than defense attorneys reported reading a law review
or psychological article about eyewitness testimony, attending a
lecture or seminar on eyewitness testimony, or reading a book on
eyewitness testimony. In addition 15% of US prosecutors and 5%
of the US defense attorneys answered that they had no exposure
to educational materials about eyewitness testimony. The corre-
sponding value for Norwegian judges was 19%. Moreover, 75% of
the U.S. prosecutors and 94% of the US defense attorneys, and 95%
of the Italian defense attorneys believed that attorneys need more
eyewitness training. Ironically, the samples with greater knowl-
edge about eyewitness testimony were the groups who believed
they needed more training. Conversely, individuals who were rel-
atively uninformed about eyewitness testimony were more likely
to underestimate how much there is to know about it (Wise and
Safer, 2010).
CORRELATES OF ATTORNEYS’ KNOWLEDGE OF EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY
The 12 eyewitness statements in the questionnaire were combined
into a knowledge scale, which measured the number of correct
responses the Italian defense attorneys gave to the eyewitness
statements. The knowledge scale, correlated with two variables:
respondents’ belief that defendants should be convicted of a crime
solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony only in exceptional cir-
cumstances and with their estimates of the percentage of wrongful
convictions that involve eyewitness error (see Tables 1 and 2). As
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Table 2 | Correlations of the knowledge scale with other variables for various legal groups.
Topic Italian defense attorneys U.S. defense attorneys U.S. prosecutors U.S. judges Norwegian judges
Solely from eyewitness testimony −0.30** −0.21** −0.21 −0.35** −0.20*
Percentage of wrongful convictions 0.32** 0.18** 0.27* 0.21* 0.16
Years as attorney 0.18 0.15** −0.07 −0.01 −0.01
These correlations are based upon the 12-item knowledge scale inTable 1, which is slightly different than the knowledge scale used in previous publications involving
the U.S. and Norwegian samples.
*p< 0.05; **p<0.01.
indicated by Table 2, these correlations were low to moderate, sug-
gesting that knowledge of eyewitness testimony may be modestly
related to greater skepticism about the value of that testimony. The
sizes of the correlations of these two variables with the knowledge
scale were similar for the Italian defense attorneys and the U.S.
defense attorneys and prosecutors (Wise et al., 2009).
For the Italian defense attorneys, a greater number of correct
responses on the knowledge scale were related to beliefs and atti-
tudes that may be necessary for attorneys to reduce eyewitness
error. Moreover, there was little or no relationship between the
number of correct answers to the statements and legal experience
(see Table 2). For example, the number of years an Italian defense
attorney practiced law was not related to knowledge. Thus, the
data offers some support for the hypothesis that knowledge about
eyewitness factors may be related to attitudes about eyewitness
testimony rather than to legal experience. It is also possible that
more knowledgeable legal professionals tend to have attitudes and
beliefs that are necessary to reduce eyewitness error. This result
is similar to what was found in the U.S. and Norwegian surveys
of judges (Wise and Safer, 2004; Magnussen et al., 2008). Inter-
estingly, however, the majority of both prosecutors and defense
attorneys who participated in the surveys believed that attorneys
would benefit from additional training on eyewitness testimony,
and also appeared to believe that eyewitness knowledge is not just
common sense (Benton et al., 2006).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the present study confirm the results of the Wise
et al. (2009) survey that defense attorneys generally give more cor-
rect answers to questions about memory and eyewitness factors
than other legal professionals. Comparing the results for the Ital-
ian defense attorneys to the results for U.S. prosecutors and defense
attorneys and the U.S. and Norwegian judges, shows that the Ital-
ian defense attorneys scored closer to the U.S. defense attorneys
than to the other samples of U.S. and European legal profession-
als. The Italian defense attorneys’ responses in general, however,
were less accurate than the responses of the U.S. defense attorneys.
On every single item, however, the Italian defense attorneys scored
higher than the US prosecutors and closer to the U.S. defense attor-
neys; they also scored higher than U.S. and Norwegian trial judges
on every item. Thus, it is unlikely that the superior performance
of the U.S. defense attorneys (Wise et al., 2009) is a chance finding.
Furthermore, the Italian defense attorneys scored higher on almost
every statement than the Norwegian judges who outperformed the
U.S. judges (Magnussen et al., 2008). Accordingly, the differences
between the U.S. and European criminal justice systems and how
the participants for the surveys were recruited also cannot explain
the results. Rather it appears that the role of the defense attorneys
in the criminal justice system explains their superior performance
in the surveys, which raises an additional question. Was the defense
attorneys’ superior performance on the survey a product of their
greater knowledge of eyewitness testimony or their skepticism of
eyewitness testimony?
Wise et al. (2009) found evidence for both hypotheses. The
present results, however, show no correlation between the Italian
defense attorneys’scores on the knowledge scale and their exposure
to educational materials about eyewitness testimony. Further-
more, the Italian defense attorneys did not have greater exposure
to educational materials about eyewitness testimony than did the
U.S. prosecutors. In short, it appears that the Italian defense attor-
neys’ superior performance in the survey was due, to some extent,
to their skepticism about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony
rather than because of their greater knowledge. Consequently, they
likely lack sufficient knowledge to identify the circumstances when
eyewitness error is likely to occur, which would hamper their abil-
ity to effectively defend their clients from erroneous eyewitness
testimony.
The Italian defense attorneys gave a lower estimate of the role
of eyewitness error in wrongful felony convictions than the U.S.
defense attorneys. According to Wise et al. (2009), a conservative
estimate is that eyewitness error occurs in at least half of all wrong-
ful felony convictions in the United States. The estimate of the U.S.
defense attorneys was close to 60%, whereas the U.S. prosecutors’
estimate was approximately 35 cases out of 100. The mean esti-
mate for the Italian defense attorneys was almost identical to the
U.S. prosecutors. This difference may reflect cultural differences
and differences in the European and U.S. criminal justice systems.
In the U.S. DNA exoneration cases, eyewitness error occurred in
more than 75% of the cases (see text footnote 1; Saks and Koehler,
2005). Analysis of the causes of wrongful convictions in Norway,
however, shows that eyewitness error is not a major factor even
for comparable cases to the U.S. DNA exoneration cases though
the number of wrongful convictions identified in Norway is small
(Stridbeck and Magnussen, 2012). Reliable cross-national statistics
on the role of eyewitness errors in wrongful convictions would be
illuminating. It may be that U.S. defense attorneys, who are more
familiar with the DNA exoneration cases, are more sensitive to
eyewitness error than their European counterparts and thus more
motivated to learn about the cause of eyewitness error.
There are many differences between U.S. and European crim-
inal justice systems and how attorneys and judges are trained
and selected, which may impact their views of the accuracy of
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eyewitness testimony (Stridbeck and Granhag, 2010). Nonethe-
less, the results of the present study suggest that the special role of
the defense attorneys in criminal justice systems makes them more
skeptical of eyewitness accuracy than other legal professionals.
In conclusion, the various cross-national surveys have con-
sistently found that legal professionals lack knowledge about
eyewitness evidence, but that they generally desire additional edu-
cation on the topic. New research should develop methods of
training new legal professionals, as well as retraining current pro-
fessionals, to better understand how memory works, the factors
that affect eyewitness accuracy, and the legal safeguards necessary
to minimize eyewitness error.
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